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Per-Subaccord staking token — no accord token in v1

Each Subaccord specifies the SPL token its Jurors stake at creation (staking_token). Selection probability ∝ amount staked in that token; coherence slashing loses the same token. USDC is the common default, not a hard-coded requirement — a Subaccord may stake USDC, SOL, or any SPL token. No accord-specific token is introduced in v1.

Considered Options

  • Hard-coded USDC (all Subaccords): simplest, but needlessly couples every Subaccord to one asset and blocks Subaccords that want a different stake (e.g. a SOL-denominated pool). Rejected — the coherence incentive is stake-asset-agnostic, so per-Subaccord choice is free.
  • Accord-specific token (PNK equivalent — fixed supply, appreciates with usage, "corrupt the accord → token crashes → attackers destroy their own wealth"): strongest game theory and attack resistance. But introduces a token (distribution, liquidity, regulatory questions), contradicts the "no token" stance, and the price mechanism isn't load-bearing at v1 scale.

Consequences

  • The Schelling Point works identically regardless of stake asset — coherence (vote with majority or lose stake) is stake-asset-agnostic.
  • No price mechanism: a wealthy attacker can stake a dominant position without worrying about "destroying token value." Mitigated by exponential appeals (bribery becomes prohibitively expensive), coherence slashing, and minimum-stake requirements.
  • Per-Subaccord tokens already provide the flexibility to adopt an accord token later (a Subaccord could set staking_token to the accord token) without changing the program.
  • Migrating to an accord-token-stake (v2) is a mechanism change, not a parameter change — acceptable as a v2 migration when attack resistance becomes load-bearing and real dispute data justifies it.